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Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [1] offer a unique way of extracting data 
from hazardous geographical regions where human intervention is extremely 
difficult, the network is often unattended, and where a specified level of 
security has to be maintained for each step of the network’s operation. Among 
all varieties of wireless networks, WSNs are the type of networks that demand 
high-level security as one of their core features. In practical terms, a WSN is 
considered a class of ad hoc networks which can form whenever needed, 
sometimes without a fixed infra-structure. We define a sensor network as a 
network consisting of a set of small sensor devices that are deployed in an ad 
hoc fashion to cooperate with each other for sensing certain physical 
phenomenon. Typically a WSN has one or more base stations (sometimes 
called as sink) and a large number of sensing devices. 
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Various issues in WSNs are still under investigation and many of them have 
yet to reach desired standards. Over the past few decades, with the 
advancements of ad hoc networking technologies, the research on WSNs has 
also been benefited. However, because of the differences in the nature of the 
works and the constrained resources of WSNs, many solutions that are devised 
for traditional ad hoc networks will not work for WSNs. 
Security in wireless sensor network has a great number of challenges, ranging 
from the nature of wireless communications, constrained resources of the 
sensors, unknown topologies of the deployed networks, unattended 
environment where sensors might be susceptible to physical attacks, dense and 
large networks, etc. [2], [3]. In fact, each of these issues leads to different 
research direction. Whenever we think about any feasible security scheme for 
WSNs, we focus on a specific aspect and often ignore the other associated 
threats. It is in reality impossible to deal with all the security threats with a 
single mechanism. Hence, the approach is often to choose the most appropriate 
mechanism, based on the situation at hand and the settings of the network. 
From the high-level point of view, we consider the following six principles 
while considering security for any system. These are collectively known as the 
philosophy of mistrust: 
- Don’t talk to any one you don’t know 
- Accept nothing without a guarantee 
- Take everyone as an enemy until proved otherwise 
- Don’t trust your friend for long 
- Use well-tried solutions 
- Watch the ground you are standing on for cracks 
Maintaining all these principles at the same time requires a lot of 
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computational, memory, and energy resources which are not available in 
wireless sensor networks. Many security solutions that are well-established for 
other wireless networks are often not fit for direct use in WSNs and any 
security solution that needs periodic renewal of any security component (e.g., 
secret key, secret hash value, session key, etc.) might not at all be viable 
because of the energy constraints. Considering these factors, devising efficient 
security mechanisms for WSNs is a challenging issue.  
1.1 Background 
Wireless sensor network is a special class of wireless ad hoc networks. Hence, 
we think that a comparative discussion about security issues in wireless ad hoc 
networks and sensor networks could be beneficial for the readers. However, 
detailed discussion on the security issues of ad hoc networks is out of the scope 
of this report. Also for brevity of the comparative discussion and the reference 
section of this report, we have opted not to put extra references regarding the 
security related works in wireless ad hoc networks. 
 
Figure 1-1. A typical wireless sensor network 
The major difference in security considerations for wireless ad hoc networks 
and that are in wireless sensor network lies in the inherent structural and 
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characteristic differences of these two networks. We know that WSN is a type 
of ad hoc network that has some type of infrastructure. There is a central entity 
that is called sink or base station which is responsible for collecting data from 
the sensors deployed in the field. The sensors in the field could be dispersed 
randomly, however there is a hierarchy of entities that could be used for 
dealing with various security aspects in WSN. So, for any security mechanism, 
in case of WSN we have a powerful entity who could serve the managerial 
tasks. On the other hand, in case of ad hoc networks or especially for mobile ad 
hoc networks (MANETs), each node acts as a routing entity as well as a host. 
Hence, without the central entity or a supporting infrastructure, the security 
mechanisms must be designed and developed. So far, there have many works in 
MANET security. All the works could be categorized mainly into: link layer 
security schemes, cooperative security schemes, and secure packet forwarding 
schemes. As each node is independent, cooperative schemes are often effective 
where each node is responsible for maintaining its own security and a group of 
nodes cooperate with each other for dealing any security threat and attack. 
Secure forwarding of packets is basically a part of secure routing. There have 
been many secure routing protocols for MANETs like ARAN [136], 
ARIADNE [137], S-AODV [138], etc.; however because of the nature of 
works and organization of the network, secure routing in WSN differs from 
those solutions. In most of the cases, it is not possible to directly utilize the 
secure routing techniques for WSNs. Besides the structural differences, the 
reason for this is the considered amount of resources in case of MANETs 
which are not the case for WSNs. As we mentioned earlier, we have opted not 
to put all the references for brevity of this report. Also after some studies, we 
have found that it would be beneficial to explore the special cases present in 
WSN in case of security. 
Before an in-depth investigation of the security threats and attacks in wireless 
sensor networks (a typical model of wireless sensor network is shown in Figure 
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1-1), let us first look at the major aspects that make the issue of maintaining 
security difficult for wireless sensor networks. 
1.1.1 Key Aspects to Consider for WSN Security 
Constrained Resources of Sensors - The sensors that build up the network are 
usually of inadequate memory, processing, and communication capabilities and 
cannot support the execution of a large amount of code. Their energy sources 
are also very limited. As an example, Crossbow MICA2 mote (shown in Figure 
1-2) [4] is a well-known sensor node with an ATmega128L 8-bit processor at 8 
MHz, 128KB program memory (flash), 512KB additional data flash memory, 
433, 868/916, or 310 MHz multi-channel radio transceiver, 38.4 kpbs radio, 
500-1000 feet outdoor range (depending on versions) with a size of only 58 x 
32 x 7 (mm).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2. Crossbow MICA2 mote (Source: 
http://www.xbow.com/products/Product_pdf_files/Wireless_pdf/MICA2_Datas
heet.pdf) 
Usually it is run by TinyOS operating system and powered by 2 AA sized 
batteries. Clearly a device with this configuration cannot support security 
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mechanisms that require executing a large amount of instructions. In addition, a 
sensor network usually contains a large number of sensor nodes. The number 
of sensors in the network might directly affect the use of memory space of 
nodes participating in the network, because often they store pre-distributed 
secret keys, keying information, or the codes to calculate pairwise secret keys 
between nodes in the network. Node failure is another problem that could also 
affect the network severely. If a node is busy relatively longer than other nodes 
in the network (e.g., performing huge calculations related to security), it might 
lose its energy rapidly and can fail much sooner than the other less active nodes. 
Table 1-1 presents the power consumption and resource data of two 
exemplary sensor node platforms; MICA2 and Tmote Mini mote (shown in 
Figure 1-3). 
Table 1-1.  Resources and energy consumption of two sensor platforms (a) 
From http://www.xbow.com/Products/Product_pdf_files/ 
Wireless_pdf/MICA2_Datasheet.pdf 
and (b) From http://www.sentilla.com/pdf/eol/Tmote_Mini_Datasheet.pdf 
Properties MICA2 (a) TMote Mini (b) 
RAM (KB) 4 10 
Program Flash Memory (KB) 128 48 
Maximum Data Rate (Kbps) 76.8 250 
Energy Consumption: Receive (mW) 36.81 57.0 
Energy Consumption: Transmit (mW) 87.90 57.0 
Energy Consumption: Sleep (mW) 0.048 0.003 
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Nature of Work of WSN - Many applications of wireless sensor networks 
require deployment of sensors in remote, unattended, hostile, or hazardous 
areas. The sensors are often exposed to various types of adversaries and could 
be attacked physically. Even if they are deployed over a field, a passing vehicle 
can run over and physically damage them. An adversary can physically search 
and destroy the nodes [5]. Environmental conditions might also affect the 
performance of the sensors or can cause physical damage. All these 
unintentional or intentional events that can cause physical damage to a sensor 
are considered physical security issues. Sometimes physical attacks (like the 
capture or destruction of nodes) can cause several types of logical security 
attacks. A good deployment or management policy, tamper-proofing 
mechanisms of the physical package of the sensors, camouflaging, protective 
shields, or other available techniques [6] could be used for dealing with 
physical security threats in wireless sensor network. More discussions on these 
issues will be provided later in this chapter. 
 
Figure 1-3. TMote Mini mote (Source: 
http://www.sentilla.com/pdf/eol/Tmote_Mini_Datasheet.pdf) 
 
Use of Wireless Communications - Wireless technology is used for 
communications in a wireless sensor network. As with any other wireless 
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network, it is also prone to various types of threats related to the unreliable 
nature of wireless links like: undelivered packets, collisions of packets, latency, 
etc. Because of the broadcast nature of wireless channels, any adversary can 
even eavesdrop or passively listen to the transmissions of any legitimate node. 
In case of wired communication, the guided media would be well-protected by 
using various means and usually the end devices come with sufficient 
protective mechanisms. On the contrary, in wireless communication, because 
of its unguided medium and open nature, many types of attacks could be 
launched. In fact, many of the security threats in WSN exist because of the use 
of wireless technology for communications among the nodes. 
1.1.2 Feasibility of Different Security Approaches in WSN 
Security is a broadly used term encompassing the characteristics of 
authentication, integrity, privacy, non-repudiation, and anti-playback [7]. Over 
the past few decades, the more the dependency on network-provided 
information has increased, the more the risk has increased for secure 
transmission of information over the networks. To ensure various aspects of 
security (i.e., authenticity, integrity, privacy, etc.), diverse approaches like 
cryptography, steganography, physical layer security, etc. are used. In this 
section, we will examine which of the major security approaches can be viable 
for wireless sensor networks. 
Cryptography - Most of the encryption-decryption techniques devised for 
traditional wired networks are not fit for direct use in wireless networks. As 
mentioned previously, WSNs consist of tiny low-cost devices which possess 
scarce processing, memory, and battery power resources. Applying any kind of 
encryption scheme requires transmission of extra bits, and thus requires extra 
processing, memory, and battery power which can impact the network’s 
longevity. Encryption and decryption operations can also increase delay, jitter, 
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and packet loss in wireless sensor networks. Moreover, critical questions arise 
when applying an encryption-decryption scheme to WSN like: How the keys 
should be generated? How the keys should be disseminated? How the keys 
should be managed? What is the procedure to revoke the keys? How the keys 
could be assigned to a newly added sensor? As minimal (or no) human 
interaction is one of the fundamental features of WSN, it is also a crucial point 
to decide how the keys could be modified/refreshed from time to time for 
encryption. Adoption of pre-loaded keys or embedded keys might always not 
be the best solution. Overall, schemes that are based on cryptographic 
techniques must be lightweight so sensors can support them along with other 
programs, which are running and sharing the same resources. 
Steganography - While cryptography aims at hiding the content of a message, 
steganography [8], [9] aims at hiding the existence of the message. 
Steganography is the art of covert communication by embedding a message 
into the multimedia data (image, sound, video, etc.) [10]. The main objective of 
steganography is to modify the carrier in a way so that it is not perceptible and 
hence, looks ordinary. It hides the existence of the covert channel, and 
furthermore, if we want to send a secret data without sender information or 
want to distribute secret data publicly, it is very useful. However, securing 
wireless sensor networks is not directly related to steganography. Processing 
multimedia data (like audio, video) with the inadequate resources of the 
sensors is difficult. Steganography in WSNs remains as an open research issue 
that will not be solved until the sensors acquire enough capabilities to support 
extensive computations associated with it. 
Physical Layer Secure Access - Physical layer secure access in wireless 
sensor networks could be provided by using frequency hopping. A dynamic 
combination of the parameters like hopping set (available frequencies for 
hopping), dwell time (time interval per hop), and hopping pattern (the sequence 
in which the frequencies from the available hopping set is used) could be used 
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with a little expense of memory, processing, and energy resources. Important 
point in physical layer secure access is the efficient design so that the hopping 
sequence is modified in less time than is required to discover it. One drawback 
for employing this is that both the sender and receiver should maintain a 
synchronized clock, therefore time synchronization in WSN [11] is another 
important research issue. 
Considering all the basic security approaches, lightweight cryptography, 
logical or algorithmic schemes could be the best choice for WSN security. We 
must keep in mind that the higher the level of security of a WSN, the higher the 
amount of resources needed to support it. 
1.2 Motivation and Report Contribution 
1.2.1 Motivation and Problem Description 
Because of the scarcity of resources of the tiny sensors, any kind of operation 
in a wireless sensor network must be done with special care. Resource 
efficiency should be given the highest priority in handling any aspect. 
Resources for a wireless sensor network are the computation power, storage 
capacity, energy level, and range of the wireless radio of the sensors. 
Sometimes, time could even be considered as a resource for WSN as timely 
data are required for deciding whether a particular sensor report should be 
taken into consideration while taking managerial decision. This is an 
interesting fact that employing high-level security needs utilization of 
considerable amount of available resources; again to make any security 
mechanism resource-efficient, number of tasks and communications, and 
amount of data need to be reduced. Hence, a trade off is needed between these 
two apparently conflicting objectives. To deal with these issues, one good 
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strategy is to consider ensuring security of the network from the very beginning 
state and then based on the acquired structure, carrying out the network’s 
operation. This particular philosophy motivated us to write this report. We deal 
with the issue of handling security management in WSN in resource-efficient 
way so that we could get the maximum benefit with minimum exploitation of 
available resources. 
1.2.2 Goals and Contributions 
An important point is that the required level of security of any WSN often 
depends on the type of application. For a short-term military application, high 
level security is needed from the start up to the end. If resource efficiency can 
be ensured for such military application, the network lifetime could be 
maximized and more benefits could be achieved. For any other type of WSN 
application, a moderate level security could be enough but resource efficiency 
might be a crucial factor. 
Before discussing the contributions of the report, we would like to clarify the 
term, ‘level of security’ used for our cases. As multiple factors are associated 
with the security issues in WSN, we indicate various facets of security when 
we use this term in the report. The issues include physical security of the 
sensors, topological security of the network (dense or sparse network), 
deployment security (the way the sensor deployments are handled), wireless 
communication security, and data security. If one aspect is weak, we consider 
that the level of security for that network is weak. Hence, ‘high-level security’ 
in our case means that all aspects of security are considered while taking any 
measure. 
There is another way to view the issue of security in WSN known as holistic 
security. This brings forward the concept of layer-wise security in such type of 
network. Based on the very well-known OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) 
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reference model, we could think about ensuring security for each layer. 
Especially for wireless sensor networks, five layers are relevant; application 
layer, transport layer, network layer, link layer, and physical layer. Lack of 
security in any of these levels weakens the overall security of the network. We 
partially address this view of security in the report. However, full solution 
where different mechanisms could work in cooperation is still an open area of 
research which would take huge effort to develop. 
Considering all these points, we propose our schemes in this report. Our 
mechanisms guarantee resource efficiency, good level of security, and prevent 
the inclusion of rogue nodes in the network from the bootstrapping state. In 
fact, most of the attacks against security mechanisms in wireless sensor 
network are launched due to the injection of false information either by 
compromised nodes residing in the network or by alien attackers. Hence, many 
attacks can be resisted by employing efficient schemes that can prevent the 
attackers from being included in the network from its formation stage. As 
sensors are equipped with constrained resources, our aim is to ensure efficient 
utilization of resources for our mechanisms. Both of our mechanisms can be 
integrated if any application needs that. For this case, using the first approach 
we can make sure that the entities we are dealing with are legitimate entities 
and no rogue node is included in our initially formed network. Then, on top of 
that, we could apply our secure routing protocol to provide both secure and 
energy-efficient data transmission in the network. Other routing protocols 
could also be used instead of our protocol. However, in that case, applying 
extra security mechanism for ensuring data transmission security might take 
more resources. It should be mentioned here that most of the other routing 
protocols do not consider any type of security as part of their working 
mechanisms. The consequent chapters deal with all these issues with 
explanations and detailed analyses of our approaches. 
A good point to keep in mind is that no system is fool-proof. Hence, along 
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with the achievements our work, we also point out the drawbacks and possible 
disadvantages of our schemes. As the benefits are greater than the drawbacks, 
we believe that our work contributes significantly in the field of security in 
wireless sensor networks. 
1.3 Outline of this Report 
We have started the report with a brief introduction to WSN security. 
Subsequent chapters are organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 explores major threats and attacks against wireless sensor networks, 
their detection, prevention, and attack countermeasures, key management 
issues, and secure routing issues. Also it presents a holistic view of security in 
WSN and some achievements and goals for research on WSN security. We 
have discussed all the security threats and attacks against WSN because we 
need to have clear idea about the vastness of security aspects in WSN. In fact, 
our mechanisms try to establish a defensive system so that many of these 
threats and attacks could be thwarted from the bootstrapping state of the 
network.  
 
  
Chapter 2                       
Literature Review: Security Issues in 
Wireless Sensor Network 
This chapter explores various types of threats and attacks against wireless 
sensor networks, possible countermeasures, and notable concepts on WSN 
security. We discuss these issues in detail because; most of the attacks are 
launched by using malicious nodes or with the help of malicious entities in the 
network. Hence, knowing the vastness of security aspects in WSN can give us 
a clear understanding about the difficulty of designing and developing efficient 
security systems for such type of network. 
Several factors can be considered for categorizing the attacks in WSNs like; 
the approach of attack, target of the attack, position of attacker, role of attacker, 
etc. Overall, we can classify all of the known attacks into three basic types: 
Type I 
Attacks on the Basic Mechanism (e.g., attacks against routing in the network) 
Attacks on the Security Mechanisms (e.g., against cryptographic scheme or 
against key management scheme) 
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Type II 
Passive Attack – It typically means eavesdropping of data. In this case, the 
attacker passively listens to the transmitted data in the network and can use the 
collected information later for launching other types of attacks.   
Active Attack – Any type of direct attack caused by an adversary. The attacker 
actively participates in the collection, modification, and fabrication of data. The 
information collected by passive attacks can be used for active attacks. 
Type III 
External Attack – In an external attack, an outsider is involved. These attacks 
can cause denial of service (DoS) situation, congestion, propagation of wrong 
routing information, etc. Typically external attacks can be resisted using 
firewalls, encryption mechanisms, and good security management policy. 
Internal Attack – An Internal attack sometimes could be very harmful for the 
network as any node within the network works as an attacker in this case. 
Internal attack is performed by compromising node(s) in the network. 
Compromising a node means convincing a legitimate node to help the attacker 
or persuading a node in the network to work on behalf of the attacking entity. 
Often it is difficult to detect an internal attacker within the network that has a 
legitimate identity. Various kinds of authentication schemes, intrusion detection 
schemes, or membership verification schemes can be used for preventing it. 
Other than these basic categories, several attacks are given formal names. 
2.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack 
Strictly speaking, we consider any kind of attempt of an adversary to disrupt, 
subvert, or destroy the network as a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. In reality, 
any kind of incident that diminishes, eliminates, or hinders the normal 
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activities of the network can cause a DoS situation. Some examples include 
hardware failures, software bugs, resource exhaustion, environmental 
conditions, or any type of complicated interaction of these factors. Note that, 
DoS (Denial of Service) is basically a given formal name of a particular 
condition of the network but when it occurs as a result of an intentional attempt 
of an adversary, it is called DoS attack. In general, ‘Denial of Service (DoS)’ is 
an umbrella term that can indicate many kinds of events in the network in 
which legitimate nodes are deprived of getting of expected services for some 
reasons (intentional attempts or unintentional incidents). 
DoS attacks can mainly be categorized into three types: 
(1) Consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources 
(2) Destruction or alteration of configuration information 
(3) Physical destruction or alteration of network resources 
Among these types of DoS attacks, the first one is the most significant for 
wireless sensor networks as the sensors in the network suffer from the lack of 
resources. Other than these basic types, categorization of DoS attacks can be 
done according to the layers of the network architecture [12], [13]. An attacker 
can choose different targets at different layers to stop proper functioning of 
legitimate nodes so that they cannot get the services they are entitled to. 
Though it is quite difficult to know whether any particular DoS situation is 
caused intentionally or unintentionally, there are some common prevention and 
detection methods for each of the DoS attacks. 
Let us now have a look at the DoS attacks in WSNs by layer: 
DoS Attacks in Physical Layer 
Jamming – Jamming means the deliberate interference with radio reception to 
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deny a target's use of a communication channel. For single-frequency networks, 
it is simple and effective, causing the jammed node unable to communicate or 
coordinate with others in the network. Due to their very nature, wireless sensor 
networks are probably the category of wireless networks most vulnerable to 
“radio channel jamming”-based Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [14]. Mainly 
two types of jamming could be possible; constant and sporadic. In case of 
constant jamming, attacker interferes with the signals of a legitimate node 
continuously for a certain period of time while in case of sporadic jamming, the 
attacker intermittently causes jamming. Sporadic jamming in the network is 
often more difficult to detect than detecting constant jamming. Some solutions 
to deal with jamming in WSN are proposed in [14], [15], and [16]. 
Tampering – Due to the unattended feature of wireless sensor networks, an 
attacker can physically damage/replace sensors, parts of computational and 
sensitive hardware, even can extract cryptographic keys to gain unrestricted 
access to higher communication layers. Tampering is actually any type of 
physical attack on sensors in the network. Success in tampering depends on: (a) 
how accurately and efficiently the designer considered the potential threats at 
design time, (b) resources available for design, construction, and test, (c)  
attacker’s cleverness and determination 
DoS Attacks in Link Layer 
Collision – Adversaries may only need to induce a collision in one octet of a 
transmission to disrupt even a relatively longer packet. As the resources of the 
sensors are scarce, such loss could be significant in many cases. Also it is a 
great hurdle for acquiring timely and accurate data from the sensors. 
Unfortunately, in wireless networks, detection of a collision with a node's own 
transmission is difficult. Standard collision avoidance mechanisms also cannot 
help as they are cooperative by nature. An attacker simply can ignore the 
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avoidance protocol and transmit at the same time as the victim. One possible 
solution could be the use of error correction codes (ECC) but with the use of 
ECC, more processing and communication overheads are incurred. 
Exhaustion – Battery exhaustion attack could be launched with repeated 
requests for using the channel. A naive link layer implementation could be a 
target for this type of attack. Feasible defense mechanisms against battery 
exhaustion caused by repeated transmissions could be the use of time division 
multiple access (TDMA) or rate limitation. Additional logic could also be 
developed to help these mechanisms. 
Unfairness – Unfairness is a weaker form of DoS attack. This threat may not 
entirely prevent legitimate access to the channel, but could degrade service for 
real time MAC protocols. In fact, ensuring fairness in WSN is often viewed as 
a separate research issue. Use of small frames might be helpful in this case. 
However this would also incur some framing overhead. 
DoS Attacks in Network Layer 
Neglect and Greed – If a node drops packets or denies transmitting 
legitimate packets or if a node is very greedy to give undue priority to its own 
messages, these could be considered as ‘neglect and greed’. Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) protocol or the protocols that are based on DSR are especially 
vulnerable to this type of attack. Use of multipath routing or redundant message 
transmission could be the solutions for handling such attacks. However, for 
WSNs these solutions might not be feasible. Instead, use of some other routing 
mechanisms could help. 
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Homing – Sometimes in WSNs, some nodes are given some special 
responsibilities like managing cryptographic keys, making use of acquired data, 
maintaining a local group, etc. Often the adversaries are attracted to these 
leader nodes and try to eavesdrop on their activities. In case of homing attack, 
the adversaries try to hamper the normal functioning of such types of leader 
nodes within a WSN. Different types of cryptographic schemes, algorithms, 
hiding management messages, etc. could be used for preventing homing attack. 
Misdirection – It means simply directing the legitimate packets to the 
wrong path. A malicious insider can cause misdirection of traffic. Egress 
filtering, authorization and monitoring, or any kind of intrusion detection 
scheme (IDS) [17] could be used to prevent this type of DoS attack. 
Blackhole – Blackhole (or Sinkhole) attack itself is one of the major 
attacks in WSN. We will discuss this attack in detail later in this chapter. 
However, when this attack causes any type of denial of service in the network, 
it is considered as a DoS attack in network layer. 
Transport Layer DoS Attacks 
Flooding – Protocols which must keep the states of both end-nodes are 
particularly vulnerable to this attack. It aims at memory exhaustion of the 
nodes by flooding of a great number of packets. Client puzzles or traceback 
mechanisms could be used to deal with such type of DoS attack. 
Desynchronization – This attack means forging of packets during 
transmission. Existing connection between two endpoints could be effectively 
  
Literature Review and Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Network 20 
disrupted by desynchronization. Any kind of authentication mechanism for the 
packets could be used to handle desynchronization attack. 
DoS Attacks in Application Layer 
External Stimuli - If the communications of nodes in a WSN are triggered by 
each occurred event, an application layer DoS attack could be launched by 
using some external physical stimuli. In such a case, the attacker uses the 
external stimuli to stimulate the nodes with huge number of events to be sent 
towards the base station. This attack is not effective when sensor readings are 
sent after making a gist or with regular intervals (for example, a clustered 
network where the clusterheads collect the raw data first and then send reports 
to the base station after certain intervals). On the other hand, some type of 
intrusion detection mechanism (IDM) can be used to detect the presence of any 
external entity in the network if a particular region creates a large volume of 
readings within a short period. An effective IDM can prevent the instant 
triggering of sensors by notifying the presence of intruder in the network and 
isolating it or ignoring it. However, such type of IDM is difficult to develop as 
sensor nodes cannot determine the legitimacy of a particular physical stimulus 
rather they only sense the event and get triggered.   
PDoS - Path based DoS (PDoS) attack is another kind of application layer 
DoS attack. Each of the nodes in a path towards the base station needs to 
participate in the forwarding process of a particular packet containing sensor 
readings. If a large number of bogus packets are sent through a path towards 
the base station, it can keep the nodes busy, deny transmission of legitimate 
traffic by occupying network resources, and significantly drain the resources of 
the sensors. Use of various authentication mechanisms or replay protection 
mechanism could be the effective countermeasures against this type of attack.  
Bogus Message During Reprogramming - A third type of application layer 
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attack could be launched if a WSN allows reprogramming of the network. 
Reprogramming of a sensor network may be needed for version control, scope 
selection, encoding-decoding, code dissemination, completion validation, code 
acquisition, switching to a new program, and/or for network management 
purpose [18]. In these cases, if the process of reprogramming is not secure 
enough, the attackers can actively cut off a portion of the network by using 
bogus messages. Good authentication mechanism for the whole process can 
resist this type of attack. 
Other than these attacks, many other individually considered attacks like 
wormhole attack, hello flood attack, sybil attack etc. can also cause denial of 
service situation in the network. In fact, many of the methods of attacking and 
targets of attacks overlap with each other, but considering different 
circumstances, are given different tags and names. It should be clear that, any 
sort of intentional attempt that causes any sort of denial of service situation in 
the network is considered as DoS attack. As we will examine all other attacks 
in the rest of the chapter, here we conclude this section with the names of the 
major types of DoS attacks only. 
2.2 Attacks on Information in Transit 
The basic task of a sensor is to monitor the changes of some specific 
parameters (like temperature, sound, magnetism, light level, etc.) and to report 
those to the base station. The readings from the sensors could be transmitted 
using various methods. While in transit, the packets may be altered, spoofed, or 
vanished on the way (this type of attack could also be considered as network 
layer DoS attack when it resists a valid node from getting its expected service). 
As wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping, any attacker can 
monitor the traffic flow and get into action to interrupt, intercept, modify, or 
fabricate packets. 
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Figure 2-1. Conceptual view of a Sybil Attack. The node with id s6 is 
pretending to be three nodes at the same time (s6, s7, and s8), the nodes s3 and 
s4 do not have direct contacts with s7 and s8, so s6 can pretend to them as it is 
s7 or s8. Here, additional ids of s6 are called the ‘Sybil nodes’ (s7 and s8) 
If the routing method does not have proper security measures, wrong 
information even can reach up to the base station and thus can influence the 
decision taken by the central authority. Such an event might be extremely 
dangerous for a military reconnaissance scenario which could lead to taking 
disastrous military decisions. As sensor nodes typically have short range of 
transmission and scarce resources, an attacker with adequate processing power 
and larger communication range can attack several sensors at the same time to 
modify the actual information during transmission. Among several works, a 
good approach to tackle this and to filter out falsely injected data in sensor 
networks is presented in [19]. 
2.3 Sybil Attack 
Sometimes the sensors in a wireless sensor network might need to work 
together to accomplish a task, hence the management policy of the network can 
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use distribution of subtasks and redundancy of information. In such a situation, 
a node can pretend to be more than one node at the same time using the 
identities of other legitimate nodes. This type of attack is called a Sybil attack 
[20]. The malicious device’s additional identities are called the Sybil nodes. 
Sybil attack tries to degrade the integrity of data, level of security, and resource 
utilization that a distributed algorithm targets to achieve. This type of attack 
can be performed for downgrading the performances of distributed storage, 
routing mechanism, data aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation, and 
misbehavior detection mechanisms. A conceptual view of Sybil attack is shown 
in Figure 2-1. Basically, any peer-to-peer network (any kind of wireless ad hoc 
network) is vulnerable to Sybil attack. Newsome et al. [21] presented a 
taxonomy of sybil attacks in WSN based on three orthogonal dimensions. 
Dimension I 
Direct Communication – In this case, Sybil nodes directly communicate with 
the legitimate nodes. When a legitimate node sends message to a Sybil node, 
malicious device listens to the message. In the same way, messages sent from 
the Sybil nodes are actually sent from the malicious device. 
Indirect Communication – In this case, the legitimate nodes cannot directly 
communicate with the Sybil nodes rather a malicious device convinces them 
that it can reach to the Sybil nodes. Any message sent by a legitimate node to a 
Sybil node is routed through the malicious node which can do anything 
(modification, fabrication, dropping, etc.) with the received messages. 
Dimension II 
Identities used for the Sybil nodes could be obtained in one of two ways: 
  
Literature Review and Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Network 24 
Fabricated Identities – Attacker can simply generate a fake identity supported 
by the network and perform Sybil attack. 
Stolen Identities – Attacker in this case steals the identities of the legitimate 
nodes and uses those for launching attacks. 
Dimension III 
The identities of the Sybil nodes could be used in two ways: 
Simultaneous – The malicious node or the attacker can pretend to have 
multiple identities at the same time (as shown in Figure 2-1). 
Non-simultaneous – The attacker can somehow obtain a large number of valid 
identities but, instead of using all the identities at the same time, it can use 
those one after another in different time slots. 
One advantage for WSN to face Sybil attack is that, it can have some sort of 
centralized entity (base station or cluster head) in the network. Hence, this 
attack could be prevented using efficient protocols. Douceur [20] showed that, 
without a logically centralized authority, sybil attacks are always possible 
except under extreme and unrealistic assumptions of resource parity and 
coordination among entities. However, detection of sybil nodes in a network is 
not so easy. Some of the recently proposed detection and prevention 
mechanisms could be found in [22], [23], [24], [25], and [26]. 
2.4 Blackhole/Sinkhole Attack 
In this attack, a malicious node acts as a blackhole [27] to attract all the traffic 
in the network.  Especially in a flooding based protocol, the attacker listens to 
the route request and then replies to the target node saying that it has a high 
quality or shortest path to the base station. A victim node is thus lured to select 
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it as a forwarder of its packets. Once the malicious device is able to insert itself 
between the communicating entities (between the base station and sensor node), 
it is able to do whatever it wishes with the packets that pass through it. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2-2. Conceptual view of a Blackhole/Sinkhole Attack. The attacker 
advertises high quality link through it which tempts s3, s4, s6, and s7 to select 
itself as a forwarding node for their packets. In the figure, B is the base station 
and the large gray circle is the attacker’s radio range 
The blackhole (i.e., malicious node or the attacker) can drop the packets, 
selectively forward those to the base station or to the next node, or even can 
change the content of the packets. This type of attack could be very harmful for 
those nodes that are considerably far from the base station. We should keep in 
mind that blackhole attack and sinkhole attack are basically the same attack but 
these two terms are often used interchangeably. As mentioned earlier, this 
attack can cause DoS in the network and thus could be considered as one type 
of DoS attack. Figure 2-2 shows a conceptual view of a blackhole/sinkhole 
attack. Some recent works addressing this attack and possible solutions to deal 
with it are [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], and [35]. 
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2.5 Hello Flood Attack 
Hello flood Attack was first detected and introduced by Karlof and Wagnor in 
[36]. This attack uses HELLO packets as a weapon to convince the sensors in 
the network. Many protocols require broadcasting of HELLO packets for 
neighbor discovery. In this case, a node receiving such a packet may assume 
that it is within (normal) radio range of the sender node. This assumption could 
be exploited by an attacker. An attacker with a large radio transmission range 
(termed as a laptop-class attacker in [36]) and enough processing power can 
send HELLO packets to a large number of sensors in the network. Thus the 
sensors could be persuaded that the adversary is their neighbor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Hello flood Attack. A Laptop-class attacker (attacker with large 
radio range) is transmitting the HELLO packets and pretending to be a 
neighbor of all other legitimate nodes within its radio range 
As a consequence, while sending the information to the base station, the 
victim nodes try to go through the attacker as they know it as their neighbor. A 
conceptual picture of hello flood attack is presented in Figure 2-3. Possible 
countermeasures to handle hello flood attack could be the use of bidirectional 
verification of links before using them, multipath routing, use of multiple base 
stations [37], or any kind of lightweight packet authentication scheme. 
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2.6 Wormhole Attack 
Wormhole attack is a very critical attack in which the attacker records the 
packets (or bits) at one location in the network and tunnels those to another 
location [38]. The tunneling or retransmission of bits could be done selectively. 
Wormhole attack is a significant threat to wireless sensor networks because this 
is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any node, and even if all 
communications provide authenticity and confidentiality. It could be performed 
even at the initial phase when the sensors start discovering the neighborhood 
information.  
 
Figure 2-4. Wormhole attack. Two attackers have created a dedicated tunnel 
between them and are attracting traffic 
Figure 2-4 shows a graphical representation of wormhole attack. In the figure, 
two adversaries are communicating with each other through a direct and 
dedicated channel by using wired link or additional RF (radio-frequency) 
transceivers with longer transmission range. The route via the wormhole looks 
like an attractive path to the legitimate sensor nodes because it generally offers 
less number of hops and less delay than other normal routing paths. While 
relaying packets, the adversaries can arbitrarily drop the packets. Therefore 
data communications through the wormhole suffer from severe performance 
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degradation. In a recently published work, Sharif and Leckie propose three new 
variants of wormhole attacks namely Energy Depleting Wormhole Attack 
(EDWA), Indirect Blackhole Attack (IBA), and Targeted Energy Depleting 
Wormhole Attack (TEDWA). Interested readers are suggested to read [39]. 
Several works tried to defend against this attack by detection of intruder 
nodes in the network. Some of them are [28], [33], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], 
[45], [46], and [47]. Other than these works, [48] proposes an approach to deal 
with wormhole attacks using directional antennas, which is often not feasible 
for sensor networks. 
So far, we have talked about various security threats and attacks in wireless 
sensor networks. Most of these attacks can be tackled by using proper 
cryptographic mechanisms. If the node authentication method is robust and 
messages in the network are made illegible to the outside entities, many 
security problems are eventually resolved or just need a little add-on with the 
defense mechanism. For utilizing any kind of cryptographic operation in the 
network, key management is a fundamental issue to deal with. Given the 
constrained resources of the sensors and the special characteristics of wireless 
sensor networks, key management in WSN is considered to be a very 
challenging topic and a hot research issue. Efficient mechanisms and 
management policies are needed to determine how the keys in such a network 
would be generated, stored, used, manipulated, renewed, or revoked. In the 
next section, we will try to get some insights on these issues. 
Table 2-1. Major attacks and threats against WSN at a glance 
Denial of Service Attack 
DoS Attacks in Physical Layer 
DoS Attacks in Link Layer 
DoS Attacks in Network Layer 
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Transport Layer DoS Attacks 
DoS Attacks in Application Layer 
Attacks on Information in Transit 
Sybil Attack 
Dimension I  
Direct Communication 
Indirect Communication 
Dimension II 
Fabricated Identities 
Stolen Identities 
Dimension III 
Simultaneous 
Non-simultaneous 
Blackhole/Sinkhole Attack 
Wormhole Attack 
 
2.7 Key Management Issues in WSN 
Primary goal of key management is to set up secure links among the 
neighboring nodes in the network at the formation phase. Some of the major 
challenges any kind of key management mechanism faces are:  
(i) Unknown scalability of the network. It means that if there are n number 
of nodes initially in the network, n´ more nodes could be added to it later. The 
key management scheme must consider the tactics to handle the addition of 
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nodes in the network. 
(ii) Unknown topological distribution of sensors in the network. As the 
topological information of the sensors are often very difficult to obtain and not 
known in prior in most of the cases, the key management scheme must 
distribute keys or keying information in such a way that the neighbor nodes 
could communicate securely with each other. 
(iii) Limited available resources of the sensors. Like any other mechanism, 
this is a great hurdle that the key management scheme must confront with. 
(iv) What if the nodes in the network are captured by adversaries? The 
key revocation mechanism should ensure that the captured keys cannot be used 
further in the network and still the network should be able to keep functioning 
with proper level of security. 
(v) Re-keying. If there is any re-keying mechanism in the management 
scheme, how to generate or distribute the new keys among the already 
deployed sensors in the network? 
There are mainly three kinds of approaches for key management in wireless 
sensor network: 
- Key Pre-Distribution 
- Key Management Based on Public Key 
- Key Management Based on Online Server 
Key Pre-Distribution 
In case of key pre-distribution schemes, keys or the keying materials are 
delivered to all sensor nodes prior to their deployment. Keying materials are 
partial information of the keys that could be used by the nodes to derive keys 
  
Chapter 2 31 
for node-to-node secure communications. Among all the key management 
approaches, key pre-distribution seems to be the most feasible solution. This is 
because; most of the operations in this approach can be done prior to the 
deployment of the network. 
For key pre-distribution, we mainly consider two phases of operations; 
initialization phase and network formation phase. In the initialization phase, 
most of the planning and computations are done so that the sensors could get 
relief of the heavy computational burdens. In the formation phase, the sensors 
establish secure links among themselves based on the pre-stored information in 
their memories. 
There are mainly three approaches of key pre-distribution: 
System key pre-distribution – Same key k is stored in each sensor. k could 
also be used for deriving other keys for secure communications among the 
sensors. The advantage of this approach is the use of little memory to store the 
key. The drawbacks are little resilience and weak authentication.  
Trivial key pre-distribution – Distinct pairwise keys jik ,  are stored for each 
pair of nodes is  and js . The two nodes contact with each other to derive the 
pairwise key for further secure communications. The advantage of this 
approach is greater resilience and strength of authentication. However, this 
approach is not scalable and in this case, it is hard to handle the addition of 
new sensors in the network. 
Random key pre-distribution – In this approach, a number of random keys 
(say w keys) from a key pool is stored in the sensors. Any two nodes in the 
network may share a key with probability p. The advantage of this type of 
scheme is the resiliency and support for addition of new sensors in the network. 
On the other hand, the drawbacks are the lose node authentication and 
possibility of not finding a common key even among the neighboring nodes. 
One of the legendary works on random key pre-distribution, known as the 
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basic scheme was proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [49]. The basic scheme 
is one of the early works which opened the door for further research on various 
aspects of key management in this type of network. 
Key Management Based on Public-Key 
Public key based schemes use asymmetric keys for encryption and decryption 
operations. There are some well-established public-key based schemes like 
Diffie-Hellman, Digital Signature Standard, ElGamal, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC), RSA, etc. [50]. But the reality is, public key 
cryptography (PKC) based schemes are often not directly applicable for 
wireless sensor networks. As mentioned earlier, the limitation of resources of 
the sensors is the major hurdle for using these mechanisms. Also the need for a 
certificate authority or a trusted middle-man, unknown topology of the network, 
and random deployment of sensors often make their use more difficult. In spite 
of the existence of these barriers, the existing PKC schemes could somehow be 
modified for making them suitable for use in the sensors. Often the number of 
operations is reduced to make the PKC schemes a bit lightweight. Though in 
the early days, the researchers thought that the PKC schemes are in all the 
ways inappropriate for WSN, some recent works have shown that some 
lightweight versions of these schemes might be very effective for high-security 
demanding applications. The works like [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], 
[58], [59], [60], [61], and [62] have presented some success stories and gains 
regarding using public key based security mechanisms and key management in 
WSN. 
Key Management Based on Online Server  
In this approach, an online server provides the necessary keys to the sensors 
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for communications among themselves. The key could be provided by the base 
station or by the group leaders (sometimes called as cluster heads) in the 
network. However, this approach is not as efficient as the key pre-distribution 
approach as in this case, the special nodes must have relatively more memory, 
processing power, and energy than those of the ordinary sensors in the network. 
Also, the special nodes should be well-dispersed in the network so that they 
can cover the whole network for providing the keys with minimum effort. 
Maintaining security during the transmission of keys also requires some other 
supporting mechanisms or some trust-based approach. Overall, most of the 
researchers agree that this approach in most of the scenarios, not a good 
solution for managing keys in this type of network. 
Some of the recent and notable works on key management in sensor networks 
are [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73], [74], [75], [76], 
[77], [78], [79], [80], and [81]. Readers are encouraged to go through these for 
gaining in-depth knowledge on key management in wireless sensor networks. 
Other than these works, a recent survey on the key management schemes in 
WSN is presented in [82]. 
2.8 Secure Routing and Physical Security Issues  
Basically, secure routing is not a separate issue than that we have discussed so 
far. If we have an efficient key management scheme with a supporting security 
infrastructure, this issue is easily solved. In that case, the whole thing reduces 
to the task of verifying who is communicating with whom and through whom. 
A number of routing protocols are proposed for wireless sensor networks (for 
further reading, [83] and [84] are suggested to the interested readers). However, 
the key point is that most of the routing protocols have overlooked the issue of 
security at their design phase. Sometimes it is quite impossible to fit a good 
security mechanism with a good routing protocol. 
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If the operational method of a routing protocol does not support a particular 
security mechanism, we need to choose any other suitable security approach 
for that one. In such a case, often the suitable security solution might not be the 
best solution or might not at all help for secure routing using that particular 
protocol. A routing protocol may focus on saving energy resources of the 
sensors, but if a security mechanism is added to it, it might not hold its major 
point of advantage or could even turn into an energy-consuming routing 
protocol. Therefore, it is better to consider the security issues at the design 
phase of any routing protocol. If the structural design and communication 
methods of the routing protocol allow the security solutions to run side-by-side 
or on top of it, then it could be beneficial for secure routing as well as for 
handling almost all types of threats and attacks in WSN.  Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that a single solution cannot solve all the problems at the same 
time. Instead, based on the application requirements and network settings, the 
strategy of routing and security should be set. Often we need to consider some 
trade offs among some parameters like security, QoS (Quality of Service), 
latency, packet loss, etc. 
In one of the prominent works on secure routing in wireless sensor networks, 
Karlof and Wagner [36] noted that: “One aspect of sensor networks that 
complicates the design of a secure routing protocol is in-network aggregation. 
In more conventional networks, a secure routing protocol is typically only 
required to guarantee message availability. Message integrity, authenticity, and 
confidentiality are handled at a higher layer by an end-to-end security 
mechanism such as SSH or SSL. End-to-end security is possible in more 
conventional networks because it is neither necessary nor desirable for 
intermediate routers to have access to the content of messages. However, in 
sensor networks, in-network processing makes end-to-end security mechanisms 
harder to deploy because intermediate nodes need direct access to the content 
of the messages. Link layer security mechanisms can help mediate some of the 
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resulting vulnerabilities, but it is not enough: we will now require much more 
from our routing protocols, and they must be designed with this in mind.” 
In general, for secure routing in wireless sensor networks, the following 
points could be considered: 
- Multipath routing can help for introducing some sort of security. 
- Use of symmetric key cryptography can reduce the processing overhead. 
- The routing protocols should be intrusion tolerant and should be able to keep 
on functioning at least up to a certain level so that the overall network 
operations are not hampered in case of the presence of intruders. 
- As involvement of security mechanisms can increase the overheads of the 
protocol, the overall design should be kept as simple as possible. 
- Any broken routing path should not hamper the functions of the associated 
security mechanisms. The working method of the protocol should allow finding 
an alternate path to the destination within a minimum interval. 
Earlier we have introduced the types of physical attacks in WSN in brief. In 
this section, we will have a closer look at the physical security issues in 
wireless sensor networks. We know that the sensors in the network could be 
physically reached by adversaries because of the network’s unattended nature. 
There are several ways to protect a sensor network from the physical attacks. 
- The most suitable way to tackle this is the concept of self-destruction. In this 
case, a sensor detects a physical attack and quickly deletes all of its hidden 
information to become non-functional. For a large-scale sensor network, this 
could be a feasible solution as their might be several backups of the sensors’ 
data, cryptographic keys, codes, and other secret information. Also if a part of 
the network is attacked, the sensors in other parts can be ready to destroy 
themselves before getting captured. Though this sort of self-destruction 
mechanism is expensive to incorporate with the sensor’s physical package, it is 
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not impossible.  
- An alternate solution could be using a mechanism where each sensor 
monitors the status of its neighbors. Any suspicious behavior of a neighbor for 
a certain period of time might trigger a warning. Consequently, other neighbors 
can get ready for hiding all of their secret information.  
- Analyzing the deployment policy and detailed mapping of the network could 
also be effective for reducing the probability of physical attacks. However, in 
many applications, such kind of thorough study might not be possible. 
- Camouflaging of sensors could be efficient in some deployment scenarios. 
Say for example, a wireless sensor network is to be deployed over a rocky hilly 
area. In that case, the sensors could be colored like rocks or could be given the 
shapes of rocks (with some outer coverings!), which can make the task of 
physically locating them more difficult. 
- Sensors might have some sort of protective shields that can save the internal 
hardware from external pressure or from other environmental conditions. 
- However, applying any of these approaches depends on the deployment 
budget and requirements of the application. Some of the recent works on 
physical security issues in wireless sensor networks can be found in [5], [6], 
[85], and [86]. 
2.9 Research Challenges 
With the sophistication of various communication protocols and rapid 
advancements of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technologies 
[87], sensors are gaining more resources and capabilities with which many 
barriers of security could be surmounted. In spite of the previous advancements 
and those that are coming in the near future, some issues regarding security in 
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WSN could still pose great challenges. In this section, we will talk about those 
issues and will try to visualize the future so that the research works on security 
in WSN may get a proper direction towards devising realistic solutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5. Holistic view of security in WSN 
2.9.1 Holistic Approach to Security in WSN 
A holistic approach (Figure 2-5) aims at improving the performance of 
wireless sensor networks with respect to security, longevity, and connectivity 
under changing environmental conditions. This approach of security concerns 
about involving all the operational layers for ensuring total security in the 
network. When talking about layering concepts, it should be mentioned that the 
security in network layer is mainly concerned about authentication, availability 
of routing information, and integrity of information, the data link layer is 
concerned mainly about data confidentiality and data freshness, and the 
physical layer is concerned about tamper-resistance. 
Holistic approach tries to lead to a single architecture so that different security 
mechanisms can work in tandem for different layers. Some key principles of 
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holistic approach are: 
In a given network, the cost for ensuring security should not surpass the 
assessed security risk at a specific time. 
If there is no physical security ensured for the sensors, the security measures 
must be able to exhibit a graceful degradation, if some of the sensors in the 
network are compromised, out of order, or captured by the enemy. 
The security measures should be developed to work in a decentralized fashion. 
Considering all types of security threats and attacks in WSN, we can 
understand that for this type of network, a single security solution for a single 
layer cannot be considered as a reasonable solution. It is better to employ a 
holistic approach so that all facets of the network could be made secure at the 
same time. As an example, if a WSN has very good security solutions for 
almost all the layers but physically the network is vulnerable, we cannot 
guarantee that the total security of the network is ensured. In such a case, any 
adversary can go and pick up the sensors from the field, extract the 
cryptographic keys, can use jamming for causing physical layer DoS attacks, 
destroy the sensors, and so on. Though physical security is often not possible to 
ensure for WSNs, at least the overall system must allow a graceful degradation 
of the network’s operation when it is attacked. However, designing and 
developing such type of efficient security architecture and management policy 
remain as an open challenge. At least we can hope that with the advancements 
of technological capabilities of sensors, this task will become a bit easier in the 
future. 
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Figure 2-6. Imote2 node (Source: 
http://www.xbow.com/Products/Product_pdf_files/Wireless_pdf/Imote2_Datas
heet.pdf) 
2.9.2 Achievements and Goals 
Today, the limitation of resources of the sensors is considered as the primary 
obstacle for applying robust security mechanisms. In future, this barrier might 
totally be vanished or might be reduced by significant extent. We might see 
sensors capable of handling even the heavy computations associated with 
public key cryptography schemes (like RSA, SHA-1, etc.) without any reduced 
operation. Say for example, one of the latest advanced wireless sensor 
platforms, Imote2 (shown in Figure 2-6) [88] is built with the low power 
PXA271 XScale processor at 13-416MHz and it integrates an 802.15.4 radio 
(CC2420) with a built-in 2.4GHz antenna. Imote2 has 256kB SRAM, 32MB 
FLASH, and 32MB SDRAM. It is a modular stackable platform and can be 
expanded with extension boards to customize the system to a specific 
application. Through the extension board connectors, sensor boards can 
provide specific analog or digital interfaces. A battery board is provided to 
supply system power, or even it can be powered via the integrated USB 
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interface. All these features make it a very powerful sensor node compared to 
its predecessors. The rechargeable feature of the sensor’s battery opens the 
door to overcome the problem of constrained and non-renewable energy. 
Considering today’s achievements, it is reasonable to assume that some years 
later we could even see sensors with much higher configurations with the same 
tiny size! If it becomes true, some interesting questions may arise. What will be 
the case if these tiny devices get the capabilities like high configuration 
computers? Will we be able to run classic security schemes that require heavy 
computations? If so, will all the works done so far be meaningless? The answer 
to all of these questions is; “No work will be thrown away even if the sensors 
achieve very high configurations”. Basically the researchers have been working 
on the fact that, given such low-configuration devices, how best level of 
security can be provided for the network. Yes, in future the sensors might get 
more capabilities keeping even today's physical size, but even then the devices 
with current specifications could remain as low-cost alternatives. Also, some 
other tiny devices might have such limited resources. It is also reasonable to 
think that the sensors with current specifications might become much smaller 
in physical size. If it becomes true, in that case, reduction of physical size 
would ultimately increase the level of physical security of these devices. In fact, 
reduced size of sensors would make them more physically secure in the hostile 
deployment areas as a relatively smaller object is harder to notice! Hence, the 
major point is, no matter how much capabilities a sensor node attains in future, 
the research works done with today’s given limitations (like MICA2’s 
specifications) will still be useful for use for the devices with such capabilities. 
As a whole, the research area will still remain challenging. 
In future we might also see wide-spread use of wireless multimedia sensor 
networks [89], [90] for various security applications like; distributed vision, 
tracking, and monitoring applications.  At that time, processing multimedia 
data might become a little bit easier. However, when issues like QoS (Quality 
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of Service) and latency are involved with this, the challenge is likely to remain 
for finding efficient solutions. In fact, ensuring a good level of QoS and a good 
level of security at the same time is always very difficult and often 
contradictory! Not only for sensor networks but also for other types of 
networks this statement is true. This is because, any sort of security operation 
requires some processing time. If the level of security is increased, the 
processing delay also increases causing degradation of quality of service. For 
real-time multimedia applications (if at all possible using WSNs or if at all 
required!), this challenge will remain for a long time. 
Some of the recent works show that, in future some applications might need 
to handle multiple types of data within the same network [91]. The 
development of sensors like ExScal motes [92], [93] has already opened the 
door for further research on heterogeneous applications using homogenous 
multi-purpose nodes. The heterogeneous data generated from such 
multipurpose nodes might have different levels of security based on their 
priorities. Handling these heterogeneous data with different security levels 
could also be an interesting topic for research in the near future. 
 
  
Viewing Angle 1 
Key Management YES 
Secure Routing YES 
Secure Services YES 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) NO 
Viewing Angle 2 
Physical security NO 
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Wireless communication security YES 
Data security YES 
Holistic security based on various layers 
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